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Abstract
Adversarial examples are slight perturbations that are designed to
fool artificial neural networks when fed as an input. In this work the
usability of the Fisher information for the detection of such adversarial
attacks is studied. We discuss various quantities whose computation
scales well with the network size, study their behavior on adversarial
examples and show how they can highlight the importance of single
input neurons, thereby providing a visual tool for further analyzing
(un-)reasonable behavior of a neural network. The potential of our
methods is demonstrated by applications to the MNIST, CIFAR10
and Fruits-360 datasets.
1 Introduction
It is occasionally said that the term artificial neural network (ANN) is poorly
chosen as the underlying mechanism has hardly anything in common with
biological neurons [5]. The existence of adversarial examples seems to back
this criticism: A tiny change to the input to an ANN, often on an almost
imperceptible scale for a human, can lead to a fundamentally different out-
put provided the dimensionality of the input space is high enough [13]. It
seems as if neural networks are only working as we expect them to do on a
small subdomain of the actual input space, while deviations might lead to
an unforeseen outcome. This phenomenon is not only discomforting from a
conceptual perspective but can in fact become safety-relevant [3], especially
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since even physical, three-dimensional objects can be equipped with an ad-
versarial property [17, 4]. Techniques that can raise a red flag on suspect
behavior have therefore become a relevant topic in current research about
adversarial examples [1]. We here show how Fisher’s information matrix can
be transformed into a tool for such purposes. Several quantities are proposed
that measure the size of the latter and allow for adversarial detection while
preserving scalability. Using a simple stochastic model for the input of the
network these quantities can be used to highlight input nodes of specific im-
portance which can serve as a further insight to a possible “unreasonable”
behavior of an ANN.
Since their discovery by Szegedy et al. [34] a variety of techniques for
possible adversarial attacks have been identified, such as the Fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [13], methods involving momentum [10], C&W attacks
[8] or DeepFool [24] to name only a few. These methods slightly disturb the
input into a certain direction that is crafted to mislead the neural network
- this can be achieved even without access to the weights [9]. In the case
of input images it might be enough to disturb only one pixel [33]. Methods
designed for the defense against such attacks either consider robustification
of the ANN [27, 22, 36, 30] or present, such as this article, methods to detect
adversarial inputs. In the latter case inputs that would count as adversarial
under these criteria can then be re-used in training to robustify and regularize
the neural network [13]. The unmasking of adversarial examples is often
achieved via addition of a certain substructure to the network [23, 14] or an
additional classifier [21, 35]. Other methods, such as the one presented in
this article, use statistical methods [19, 20, 11, 32]. While it seems, at least
in certain situations, that there is an upper bound on the effectiveness of
adversarial attacks [29], the defense against them remains so far an unresolved
issue in the application of neural networks [7]. This article complements the
literature in two ways:
• We study adversarial detection based on the Fisher information matrix,
which measures the average magnitude of the derivative of the log-
likelihood evaluated at the learned parameter, namely the weights and
biases of the network.
• In a second step we derive from the proposed quantities a vector that
indicates for each input node its importance measured in terms of the
Fisher information when exposed to hypothetical noise. This allows,
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say for applications such as image classification, a highlighting of rele-
vant areas that can be used to further examine the (un-)reasonableness
of a network output.
In much of the literature adversarial examples are postulated as lying outside
the “manifold of natural data” [12, 11, 32]. The Fisher information puts us in
a kind of a dual view: We consider the curvature of the statistical manifold
(in a loose sense, not in the one of differential geometry) that arises for
an input at the previously learned parameter values, thus judging how well
the input fits with the learned network structure. In [31, 37] the authors
considered somewhat related ideas to the ones persued here, but by treating
the input of the network as parameter. We here treat the actual parameters
of the network (usually weights and biases) as the ones considered by the
Fisher information. In [26] the authors consider the same Fisher information
as we do and use a similar objects as in (5) below to propose a robustified
learning approach.
The structure of this article is as follows: In Section 2 we recall the
definition and meaning of the Fisher information and then propose several
quantities whose computational complexity scales linearly with the network
size. The effect of an adversarial attack on the MNIST dataset is discussed
for these quantities (Figure 1). In Section 3 we show how the addition of
a hypothetical noise to the input allows for derivation of a quantity that
can visualize the influence of single input nodes on the Fisher information.
Section 4 describes the application of the presented methods from Section 2
and 3 to MNIST, CIFAR10 and Fruits-360.
2 Detecting adversarial attacks with the Fisher
information
2.1 A short recap on the Fisher information
Consider dataD that follows some sampling distribution p(D|θ) parametrized
by a p-dimensional parameter vector θ. The Fisher information for a given
value of θ equals [6]
Fθ = ED∼p(D|θ)
[∇θ log p(D|θ)∇Tθ log p(D|θ)]
= −ED∼p(D|θ)
[∇θ∇Tθ log p(D|θ)] . (1)
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(provided the log-likelihood is sufficiently smooth, which we assume for sim-
plicity throughout this article). This matrix measures the averaged local
curvature of the log-likelihood log p(D|θ). Occasionaly one thinks of the
parametrized distributions p(D|θ) as lying on a (statistical) manifold with a
distance notion given by the Kullback-Leibler-divergence [2]. If we consider
a small pertubation of θ in direction of a p dimensional vector v, say θ+ ε · v
then one checks via Taylor expansion that the Kullback-Leibler divergence
behaves as
KL(p(D|θ) |‖ p(D|θ + ε · v)) = 1
2
ε2vTFθv +O(ε3) (2)
Thus, Fθ can be seen as the metric that quantifies how much information
can locally be gained about the parameter θ (the stat. manifold is in fact
equipped with Fθ as metric [2]). A high value of Fθ indicates that the pa-
rameter is not well-adjusted to the data or, from a different point of view,
the ability to draw information about θ from the data is pretty high. The
first perspective motivates to see Fθ as a measure about the “unusualness”
of the data if we assume that our parameter vector θ is correct. If we can
thus somehow measure the size of Fθ we can use this to detect unusual data
such as adversarial examples.
Alas, the dimension of Fθ is p × p where the parameter dimension p is
even for a rather small network already of the order 106. Computing the
full matrix Fθ thus soon gets intractable. In the next section we will discuss
quantities that measure the size of Fθ without requiring us to compute the
full matrix (1).
2.2 Quantifying the Fisher information
In machine learning, one often tries to learn a parametrized mapping fθ from
the data. In the case of a neural network, which is the only scenario consid-
ered in this article, θ will contain all weights and biases for all connections of
the network and fθ will map an input, say an image, to an output, such as
a vector obtained by an application of a softmax. To learn θ assume we are
given a collection of N observations of inputs X and corresponding targets
Y . In the notation of the previous subsection (X, Y ) can be considered as
N realizations (x, y) of the random variable D. The aim is now to find θ
such that fθ(x) ≈ y for each pair of the N observations (x, y) from (X, Y ).
To embed this task into a mathematical framework one imposes a probabil-
ity model which is somehow linked with the mapping fθ. A common choice
4
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Figure 1: Left : Distribution of the quantity vT Fθv from (8) for 1000 MNIST images (green) and their
modifications trough an adversarial attack (red). For details on the adversarial attack and the computation
of vT Fθv compare Section 4.1. Right : ROC for adversarial detection based on the three quantities derived
from the Fisher information in Section 2 for the MNIST dataset. The AUC (area under the ROC curve)
is given by 0.94 for the trace of Fisher information - (4), 0.92 for the quadratic form in (5) and 0.93 for
the normalized version from (8).
would be to consider fθ(x) as the mean of a Gaussian distribution from which
y is drawn (conditional on x). For classification problems in C classes, where
the target y will lie in one of these classes, one usually chooses the output
fθ(x) to be a C-dimensional vector that sums to 1, as a kind of generalized
logistic regression [6]. We will here solely focus on this second case as it
seems to be the one that is mostly treated concerning adversarial examples.1
Suppose therefore that for an input x the components of the C-dimensional
vector fθ(x) = (f
c
θ (x))c=1,...,C are non-negative, sum to 1 and are interpreted
as the probabilities for class membership. If we treat x as deterministic, that
is we condition on x, we can write the Fisher information in (1) as
Fθ =
C∑
c=1
f cθ (x) · ∇θ log f cθ (x)∇Tθ log f cθ (x) =
C∑
c=1
∇θf cθ (x)∇Tc log fθ(x) . (3)
As already pointed out above, even for relatively small neural networks a full
computation of Fθ soon becomes intractable. However, if we are only interest
in some quantity that measures the size of (3) we can use the trace
trFθ =
p∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
∂θif
c
θ (x)∂θi log f
c
θ (x) (4)
1Similar formulas to the ones derived in Section 2.2 and 3 can however also be derived
for Gaussian likelihoods.
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which can be computed in O(C · p) by using backpropagation. Using the
class reduction we introduce in (7) below this can be reduced to O(p) so that
the computational complexity scales linearly with the network size.
Note that we can write the trace of Fθ as
∑p
i=1 e
T
i Fθei which can be
read as an average over the changes in the Kullback-Leibler distance w.r.t to
each parameter, compare the expansion (2). This motivates an alternative
quantity to (4). Instead of averaging over a full orthonormal basis we might
pick one specific direction and measure, using (3), the quadratic form
vTFθv =
C∑
c=1
vT∇θf cθ (x) · vT∇θ log f cθ (x) (5)
We here take a direction vector that is dependent on the parameter θ and
the considered datapoint (x, y), namely
v = λ · ∇θ log p(y|x, θ) (6)
If we choose the scaling λ > 0 to be the learning rate than according to (2) the
object (5) approximates the Kullback-Leibler divergence corresponding to a
single learning step in a stochastic gradient descent training (up to a factor
1/2).2 We will see in Section 3 below that (5) allows for the effective compu-
tation of a visualization tool that allows to highlight input components that
are of particular importance. In practice y, as used in (6), is often unknown,
so that we here pick the predicted class label, that is yˆ = arg maxc=1,...,C f
c
θ (x)
. This prediction can also be used to give an approximation to summations
over the set of classes such as in (4) or in (5) by replacing the C-dimensional
vector (f cθ (x))c=1,...,C by a two-dimensional vector
(f yˆθ (x),
∑
c 6=yˆ
f cθ (x)) = (f
yˆ
θ (x), 1− f yˆθ (x)) . (7)
This corresponds to a classification with two labels, namely yˆ or not yˆ .
Instead of taking (5) one might also pick the normalized object
vTFθv (8)
2We should point out that taking v equal to the natural gradient instead would trans-
form (5) into the Fisher kernel [15], whose computation is however practically unfeasible
for most neural networks.
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where v = v/‖v‖ , that ignores the magnitude of v. This object can be
seen as solely measuring the curvature of the statistical manifold at θ. We
should point out once more that whenever we speak of curvature this should
be understood in loose sense and not in the one of differential geometry.
Computing the actual, say Ricci-, curvature for the statistical manifold of a
neural network is probably unfeasible. We will see below that (8) and (5)
perform equally in the detection of adversarial examples. Using backpropa-
gation and an eventual class reduction as in (7) all quantities we introduced
here, namely (4), (5) and (8) are of a computational complexity that scales
linear with the network size. For the two quadratic forms (5) and (8) there
is even an approximation that spares us the backpropagation (for a given v).
In fact, note that in (5) the derivative w.r.t θ only appears as a directional
derivative, which allows us to approximate
vT∇θf cθ (x) ' (fθ+ε′·v − fθ)/ε′ , (9)
and similar for log fθ(x), where ε
′ > 0 is small. We will refer to this as
the finite difference approximation - this will turn out quite handy when we
introduce the visualization technique in the following section.
The left-hand side of Figure 1 shows the evaluation of (8) for 1000 ran-
domly chosen MNIST images, before (green) and after (red) an adversarial
attack. For the details on the adversarial attack we refer to Section 4 below.
We used the numerical approximation from (9). Note, that the distribution
of vTFθv is spread out to larger values as the statistical manifold will be more
curvy for images that do not suit the learned parameters such as adversarial
examples. Agreeing on a certain critical value we can thus classify an image
as adversarial once vTFθv exceeds this threshold. Varying the later yields
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) that plots the true positive rate
(TPR) versus the false positive rate (FPR). In the right - hand side of Fig-
ure 1 this is done for the MNIST dataset and all quantities introduced in
this section, namely the trace (4), the quadratic form (5) and its normal-
ized counterpart (8). All three curves have an area under of curve (AUC) of
around 0.92 (0.5 would be guessing, 1.0 perfect detection). For more details,
such as the used adversarial attack, we refer to Section 4 below.
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3 Fisher information sensitivity
To enhance the information we can draw from the quantities (5) and (8) let us
make the input to the neural network stochastic by introducing a univariate
noise variable ξ ∼ N (0, 1), independent of the hereto used framework, and
defining
xε,η = x+ ε ξ · η (10)
where ε > 0 and where η has the same dimensionality as x. In a way this is
similar to model used in [20]. The Fisher information for this noisified input,
once more conditional on x, can then be expressed as
Fε,ηθ =
C∑
c=1
Exε,µ [∇θf cθ (xε,µ)∇Tc log fθ(xε,µ)]
= Fθ + 0 +
1
2
ε2
C∑
c=1
N∑
i,j=1
ηi∇θ∂xif cθ (x)∇Tc ∂xj log fθ(x)ηj +O(ε3) ,
where we used the zero mean of the components of ξ to drop the first order
term. The second order term is practically incomputable for neural networks
of any interesting size as it involves second order derivatives. However, if
measure the quadratic form as in (5), or a normalized one as in (8), we can
write
v>Fε,ηθ v = v
>Fθv + η>δvFθη (11)
where
δvFθ =
C∑
c=1
∇x(v>∇θf cθ (x)) · ∇>x (v>∇θ log f cθ (x)) (12)
Making use of the finite difference approximation from (9) we can replace
the inner gradients by finite differences in the direction of v, so that we only
have to compute a first order derivative which can be done efficiently via
backpropagation. From (12) one might compute various objects depending
on the choice of η. We here take a straightforward approach, that scales well
with large input dimensions. Namely, for each i = 1, . . . , N take η = ei and
compute in (11) the second term as
eTi δvFθei =
C∑
c=1
∂xi(v
>∇θf cθ (x)) · ∂xi(v>∇θ log f cθ (x)) (13)
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Doing this for every i we obtain a vector (eTi δvFθei)i=1,...,N , which we call the
Fisher information sensitivity (FIS). We can read the FIS as a measure of
the importance of the ith input node. Via the finite difference approximation
from (9), backpropagation and an eventual class number reduction as in (7)
we can efficiently compute this vector in one backward pass. Let us point
out that normalizing v as in (8) for the FIS only plays a role if we want to
consider the FIS on an absolute scale. Once we only care about the relative
proportions between different i a possible normalization factor of v looses
any relevance.
4 Experiments
In this section we test the detection of adversarial examples on the MNIST,
CIFAR10 and Fruits-360 dataset using the quantities (4), (5) and (8) from
Section 2. All images were scaled to the range [0, 1]. The adversarial attacks
in this section were produced using the MI-FGSM[10] with T = 10, u = 1.0
and varying parameter . An application of the FGSM [13] yielded compa-
rable results.
The results in this section are presented by the receiver operating charac-
teristic which was computed by comparing the values of (4), (5) and (8) on
adversarial and original images. Using the FIS from Section 3 we visualize
the importance of each input pixel for a few test samples.
4.1 MNIST
We trained a standard convolutional net on the MNIST dataset [18] up to
a test accuracy of 98.5% and a training accuracy of about 99%. Applying
the MI-FGSM [10] to each image of the test set from with  = 10−1 the
accuracy drops to 52.5%. In Figure 1 the ROC was presented for the different
evaluation techniques (4), (5) and (8). For the Fisher form (5) and the
normalized version (8) we used the finite difference approximation 9 with
ε′ = 10−4. The curves were computed using 400 randomly selected test
images. The AUC (the area under the ROC curve) is around 92% for all
presented techniques and thus pretty decent. Feinman et al. [11] for instance,
using Bayesian methods and density estimation, report an AUC of 90.6%
for the FGSM and around 97.2% for the Basic iterative method from [17].
Note however that MNIST is occasionally considered as being too simple for
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(a) FIS: Same color scales. (b) FIS: Different color scales.
Figure 2: Visualization of the Fisher information sensitivity - each row corresponds to one input. The
leftmost column shows the adversarial modified image, the second column from the left shows the Fisher
information sensitivity for the adversarial image, the third shows the sensitivity for the non-adversarial
image using the same colorscale on the left image and different colorscales on the right image. For
comparison the corresponding image was drawn in the background and the difference between adversarial
and original image is plotted in the rightmost column. The network classifies the adversarial images from
top to bottom on the left as: 8(false), 4(correct) and 3(false) and on the right as: 9(false), 9(correct),
4(correct)
serious adversarial attacks [7] and that these attacks usually become efficient
for higher dimensions [13]. In fact, using a fully blown network for detection
and neglecting failed adversarial attacks, which we here take into account,
Xu et al. [35] report an AUC of around 99%.
In the left Figure 2a the visualization from the quantity (13) (with nor-
malized v) is presented. The leftmost column in each row displays the adver-
sarial image that is studied. The second row from the left plots the absolute
value of (13) for each input node, that is each pixel. The corresponding visu-
alization was made transparent and the adversarial image was plotted in the
background. The third column from the right displays the quantities (13)
for the input picture without adversarial attack using the exact same color
scale as for the adversarial picture. The corresponding (non-adversarial) pic-
ture was again plotted in the background. The rightmost column shows the
difference between adversarial and the original image as comparison.
Note that the magnitude of the Fisher information sensitivity (13) is
higher for the adversarial examples so that the sensitivity for the non-adversarial
images can in fact hardly be noticed. This effect is also true for more com-
plicated problems as MNIST, however we found already for CIFAR10, cf.
Section 4.2 below, that this striking distinguishability becomes weaker as the
problem becomes more involved.
Let us emphasize that while the Fisher information sensitivity is lower
for the non-adversarial image, it is by no means neglectable or meaningless.
In the Figure 2b the FIS is plotted for the adversarial and non-adversarial
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image using different color scales, which will also be the convention we will
use for CIFAR10 and Fruits-360 below. The area marked by the FIS in
Figure 2b is focussed on the digit for the actual input image, while it is
only partially aware of the digit for the adversarial image (on the right) - we
will have a similar finding for more complex problems below. Note finally,
that while there seems to be some relation between the area marked for the
adversarial image and the pixel difference between adversarial and original
image (rightmost image), there is no direct congruence. If we use individual
scaling as in 2b, which we will do from now on, the normalization which
lead us to the distinction between 5 and (8) looses its importance as it only
contributes a scaling factor.
4.2 CIFAR10
Due to its simplicity and lucidity MNIST is rather easy to interpret when it
comes to tasks such as visualization. However, the detection of adversarial
examples on more complex problems can be much more challenging and
thus more interesting [7]. As a next, slightly more evolved, example we
consider the CIFAR10 dataset [16]. We used a ResNet18 architecture that
was pretrained on ImageNet as available in torchvision.models package of
pytorch [28] and finetuned it to reach a (test-)accuracy of 92.7% on CIFAR10.
To this end images were rescaled to 224×224 prior to feeding through the
network. Due to this higher dimensionality of the input data an adversarial
attack tends to be much more effective [13]. In fact using the MI-FGSM with
 = 7 · 10−3 leads the accuracy drop to only 0.2%! The left side of Figure
3 shows the receiver operating characteristic for the quantities introduced in
section 2. For the computation of the curves we drew 600 randomly selected
test images. The AUC for the presented three methods is about 77%− 79%
and therefore less as for the much simpler MNIST problem but still markedly
above 0.5 (which would be pure guessing). In [11] the authors report an AUC
of 72.2% for the FGSM and of 81% for the BIM from [17] which is in the
same ballpark.
The visualization using the Fisher information sensitivity from (13) can
be seen on the right side of Figure 3. For the computation we applied the two-
class approximation from (7). The ordering is the same as in Figure 2b, i.e.
with different color scaling for both sides adapted to the corresponding order
of magnitude. We observe once more that the Fisher information sensitivity
marks only part of the relevant area for adversarial images (second column
11
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Figure 3: Left : ROC for adversarial detection for the CIFAR10 dataset. The AUC is given by 0.79 for
the trace of Fisher information - (4), 0.77 for the quadratic form in (5) and 0.77 for the normalized version
(8). For details on the adversarial attack compare text. Right : FIS visualization for various images from
CIFAR10. The structure of this table is the same as in left side of Figure 2b. The labels for deer, airplane
and bird were correctly classified by the network on the original data. For the adversarially modified
images the network predicted cat, bird and automobile.
from the left), while it covers most of the relevant pixels for the original
image (third column from the right). In the middle line for instance the FIS
mostly marks the end of the airplane which apparently resembles a bird to
the network as this is the prediction on the adversarial image.
4.3 Fruits-360
As a final example with a few more classes we consider the Fruit-360 dataset
[25] which contains, at the time of the download, 58428 images of resolution
100×100 with fruits (and vegetables) belonging to 116 classes. For validation
a test set containing 19932 images is available. Using the same convolutional
neural network as proposed in [25] we achieve an accuracy of 98.7% on the test
set. We perform an adversarial attack with the MI-FGSM with  = 7 · 10−3
that lets the accuracy drop to 12.8%.
The left side of Figure 4 displays the receiver operating characteristic
obtained for the quantities introduced in Section 2 for a random batch of
600 images. For the quadratic form (5) and its normalized counterpart (8)
we applied the finite difference approximation from (9). The AUC is roughly
82% for the quadratic form (5) and around 0.86 for the normalized Fisher
form (8) and the trace (4), lying somehow between our result for the MNIST
dataset and the one for CIFAR10.
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Figure 4: Left : ROC for adversarial detection for the Fruits-360 dataset from [25] that contains 116
different classes of fruits (and vegetables). The AUC is given by 0.86 for the trace of Fisher information
- (4), 0.82 for the quadratic form in (5) and 0.84 for the normalized version from (8). For details on
the adversarial attack compare text. Right : FIS visualization for various images from from the Fruit-360
dataset. The structure of this table is the same as in left side of Figure 2b. The labels for Williams pear,
white grape and coconut were correctly classified by the network on the original data. For the adversarial
modifications the network predicted pepino melon, banana and chestnut.
The visualization based on the FIS is shown in the right-hand side of
Figure 4, with the same scheme as in Figure 2b, that is with color scaling
adapted to the corresponding order of magnitude. The FIS was computed
using the two-class approximation from (7). While for some images, com-
pare the last row for instance, the FIS marks pretty similar areas for the
adversarial and the original image there are interesting differences for others.
Consider the second row, which is for a picture that actually shows a white
Grape. While the network makes the correct classification for the original
image, it classifies the adversarial image as being a banana, which might
correspond to the curvy structures that are highlighted by the FIS.
5 Conclusions
We introduced several quantities that are based on the Fisher information
and can be used to detect adversarial examples. In contrast to the Fisher
information these quantities are tractable even for larger network sizes. The
effectiveness of these quantities was studied on various datasets of different
complexity. A usage of the proposed concept based on the Fisher informa-
tion for the study of adversarial attacks seems natural as it measures the
“curvature” on a statistical manifold and thus the compliance between input
13
and learned parameters.
From two of these quantities, namely (5) and (8) we can derive objects
that can judge the influence of each input node on the Fisher information,
this can be used for visualization purposes. Applying this tool to adversarial
and non-adversarial images leads to the highlighting of different areas.
The presented techniques are not restricted to the usage with adversarial
examples but can also be used in a general context to raise a red flag on an
unusual input. Using the presented visualization technique the decision of
the network can further be investigated and therefore be used for a sanity
check.
References
[1] Akhtar, N., and Mian, A. Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning in computer vision: A
survey. IEEE Access 6 (2018), 14410–14430.
[2] Amari, S.-i. Differential-geometrical methods in statistics, vol. 28. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2012.
[3] Amodei, D., Olah, C., Steinhardt, J., Christiano, P., Schulman, J., and Mane´, D. Concrete
problems in ai safety. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.06565 (2016).
[4] Athalye, A., Engstrom, L., Ilyas, A., and Kwok, K. Synthesizing robust adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07397 (2017).
[5] Bengio, Y., Lee, D.-H., Bornschein, J., Mesnard, T., and Lin, Z. Towards biologically plausible
deep learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1502.04156 (2015).
[6] Bishop, C. M. Pattern recognition and machine learning. springer, 2006.
[7] Carlini, N., and Wagner, D. Adversarial examples are not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection
methods. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (2017),
ACM, pp. 3–14.
[8] Carlini, N., and Wagner, D. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In 2017 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (2017), IEEE, pp. 39–57.
[9] Chen, P.-Y., Zhang, H., Sharma, Y., Yi, J., and Hsieh, C.-J. Zoo: Zeroth order optimization
based black-box attacks to deep neural networks without training substitute models. In Proceedings
of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (2017), ACM, pp. 15–26.
[10] Dong, Y., Liao, F., Pang, T., Su, H., Zhu, J., Hu, X., and Li, J. Boosting adversarial attacks
with momentum. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition
(2018), pp. 9185–9193.
[11] Feinman, R., Curtin, R. R., Shintre, S., and Gardner, A. B. Detecting adversarial samples from
artifacts. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.00410 (2017).
[12] Gardner, J. R., Upchurch, P., Kusner, M. J., Li, Y., Weinberger, K. Q., Bala, K., and
Hopcroft, J. E. Deep manifold traversal: Changing labels with convolutional features. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1511.06421 (2015).
14
[13] Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572 (2014).
[14] Grosse, K., Manoharan, P., Papernot, N., Backes, M., and McDaniel, P. On the (statistical)
detection of adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06280 (2017).
[15] Jaakkola, T., and Haussler, D. Exploiting generative models in discriminative classifiers. In
Advances in neural information processing systems (1999), pp. 487–493.
[16] Krizhevsky, A., Hinton, G., et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. Tech.
rep., Citeseer, 2009.
[17] Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., and Bengio, S. Adversarial examples in the physical world. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1607.02533 (2016).
[18] LeCun, Y., Cortes, C., and Burges, C. Mnist handwritten digit database. AT&T Labs [Online].
Available: http://yann. lecun. com/exdb/mnist 2 (2010), 18.
[19] Li, X., and Li, F. Adversarial examples detection in deep networks with convolutional filter statistics.
In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision (2017), pp. 5764–5772.
[20] Liang, B., Li, H., Su, M., Li, X., Shi, W., and Wang, X. Detecting adversarial image examples in
deep networks with adaptive noise reduction. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.08378 (2017).
[21] Lu, J., Issaranon, T., and Forsyth, D. Safetynet: Detecting and rejecting adversarial examples
robustly. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision (2017), pp. 446–
454.
[22] Madry, A., Makelov, A., Schmidt, L., Tsipras, D., and Vladu, A. Towards deep learning models
resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083 (2017).
[23] Metzen, J. H., Genewein, T., Fischer, V., and Bischoff, B. On detecting adversarial perturba-
tions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.04267 (2017).
[24] Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.-M., Fawzi, A., and Frossard, P. Deepfool: a simple and accurate method
to fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition (2016), pp. 2574–2582.
[25] Mures¸an, H., and Oltean, M. Fruit recognition from images using deep learning. Acta Universitatis
Sapientiae, Informatica 10, 1 (2018), 26–42.
[26] Nayebi, A., and Ganguli, S. Biologically inspired protection of deep networks from adversarial
attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.09202 (2017).
[27] Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Wu, X., Jha, S., and Swami, A. Distillation as a defense to
adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks. In 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP) (2016), IEEE, pp. 582–597.
[28] Paszke, A., Gross, S., Chintala, S., Chanan, G., Yang, E., DeVito, Z., Lin, Z., Desmaison,
A., Antiga, L., and Lerer, A. Automatic differentiation in pytorch.
[29] Raghunathan, A., Steinhardt, J., and Liang, P. Certified defenses against adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.09344 (2018).
[30] Shaham, U., Yamada, Y., and Negahban, S. Understanding adversarial training: Increasing local
stability of supervised models through robust optimization. Neurocomputing 307 (2018), 195–204.
15
[31] Shi, Y., Liao, B., Chen, G., Liu, Y., Cheng, M.-M., and Feng, J. Understanding adversarial
behavior of dnns by disentangling non-robust and robust components in performance metric. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1906.02494 (2019).
[32] Smith, L., and Gal, Y. Understanding measures of uncertainty for adversarial example detection.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.08533 (2018).
[33] Su, J., Vargas, D. V., and Sakurai, K. One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networks. IEEE
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation (2019).
[34] Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus,
R. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199 (2013).
[35] Xu, W., Evans, D., and Qi, Y. Feature squeezing: Detecting adversarial examples in deep neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.01155 (2017).
[36] Zantedeschi, V., Nicolae, M.-I., and Rawat, A. Efficient defenses against adversarial attacks.
In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (2017), ACM,
pp. 39–49.
[37] Zhao, C., Fletcher, P. T., Yu, M., Peng, Y., Zhang, G., and Shen, C. The adversarial attack and
detection under the fisher information metric. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (2019), vol. 33, pp. 5869–5876.
16
